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131 
EVOLUTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN RUSSIA 
The Russian Federation is at a critical point in its development both as 
a state and as a legitimate player in the world market. Russia has a 
growing market economy.
1
 From 2000 to 2008, under former President 
Vladimir Putin‘s guidance, Russia recovered from the 1998 economic 
crisis
2
 and the residual effects of the collapse of the Soviet Union. During 
those years, Russia‘s gross domestic product (―GDP‖) increased as much 
as seventy percent.
3
 It is hoped for and anticipated that under current 
President Dmitry Medvedev economic prosperity will continue, and 
Russia, as the socio-political successor of the Soviet Union, will gain its 
place as an economic world power.  
However, Russia‘s ability to further join the international marketplace 
may be jeopardized by its lax enforcement of intellectual property rights 
and legislation, which falls short of international standards and treaties.
4
 
Russia has the dubious honor of being one of the world‘s worst intellectual 
property offenders.
5
 Russia‘s reluctance to protect and enforce intellectual 
property rights forestalls its progress in several ways. For example, Russia 
has been unsuccessful in its attempts to accede to the World Trade 
Organization (―WTO‖),6 and low investor confidence in Russian 
 
 
 1. From 2000 to 2008, Russia‘s gross domestic product greatly increased. See Russia’s 
Economy Under Vladimir Putin, infra note 3. 
 2. The 1998 crisis was largely caused by the Asian financial crisis during 1997 and 1998, which 
caused commodity prices to fall drastically. This especially damaged countries whose economies were 
heavily based on raw materials, as Russia‘s is, see infra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 3. During Putin‘s presidency, the GDP increased by about 70%. Russia’s Economy Under 
Vladimir Putin: Achievements and Failures, RIA NOVOSTI, Jan. 3, 2008, http://en.rian.ru/analysis/ 
20080301Report/100381963.html. There was 75% industrial growth, and investments increased by 
125%. Id. In 2007 alone, reports place the annual GDP growth between 7.7%, estimated by the 
Economic Development and Trade Ministry, and 8.1%, according to the Russian Statistics Service. 
Russia’s GDP Growth Reached 8.1% in 2007—Statistics Service, RIA NOVOSTI, Jan. 31, 2008, 
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080131/98116820.html. For further discussion of Russia‘s economic 
development during Putin‘s presidency, see Katya Malofeeva & Tim Brenton, Putin’s Economy—
Eight Years On, RUSSIA PROFILE, Aug. 15, 2007, http://www.russiaprofile.org/page.php?pageid= 
Business&articleid=a1187177738. 
 4. Intellectual Property Rights: A Key to Russia’s Economic Revival, RUSSIA BUSINESS 
WATCH, Summer 2000, at 32, available at http://www.cipr.org/activities/articles/RBWipr.pdf. 
 5. Russia remains on the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) Priority Watch List, 
available at http://www.iipa.com/2009_SPEC301_TOC.htm. 
 6. Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 4, at 34. Unquestionably, Russia must improve 
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights, else it will impede its efforts to join the 
WTO. 
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protection of privately held intellectual property keeps many industries 
underperforming.
7
 
Until 2006, any legitimate attempts by Russia to join the WTO were 
blocked by the United States, in part because of Russia‘s egregious 
intellectual property violations.
8
 On November 19, 2006, in Hanoi, 
Vietnam, a binding, bilateral WTO market access agreement was signed 
by United States Trade Representative, Susan C. Schwab, and Russian 
Minister of Trade and Economic Development, German Gref.
9
 Included in 
this agreement was a Side Letter concerning Russian implementation of 
key legislation for the protection and enforcement of intellectual property 
rights.
10
  
Unfortunately, however, Russia has failed to meet the requirements of 
this Side Letter. While the country has made many amendments to its 
intellectual property legislation,
11
 there are still glaring deficiencies in its 
legal scheme. Moreover, despite enhanced police and agency enforcement, 
Russian courts remain notoriously reluctant to engage in decisions 
regarding intellectual property violations.
12
 Despite seizures of goods and 
arrests, charges are seldom pursued to conviction, offenders are often freed 
 
 
 7. Id. at 32. 
 8. William New, US-Russia Bilateral/WTO Deal Pushes New Standards for IP Protection, 
BILATERALS.ORG, http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=6570. 
 9. Of the bilateral agreement, Schwab said:  
I am pleased that we have concluded this important agreement in connection with Russia‘s 
WTO accession negotiations. This is a strong and far-reaching commercial agreement that 
meets the high standards of President Bush‘s market-opening trade agenda and moves Russia 
closer to full integration into the global, rules-based trading system. Russia has become an 
increasingly important destination for American agricultural goods, a range of services, and 
manufactured products—and as Russia‘s market opens further as a result of its WTO 
membership, its importance will only grow. 
Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, United States, Russia Sign Bilateral 
WTO Market Access Agreement: Negotiations on WTO Membership Now Move to the Multilateral 
Phase (Nov. 19, 2006) [hereinafter Press Release, U.S.-Russia Bilateral Agreement], available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/PR.pdf.  
 10. Much of the legislation was to be enacted by June 1, 2007. Office of United States Trade 
Representative, Results of Bilateral Negotiations on Russia’s Accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), Action on Critical IPR Issues, TRADE FACTS, Nov. 19, 2006, at 1, http://www. 
ifap.ru/pr/2006/061206aa.pdf. Intellectual property organizations were hopeful that this binding 
agreement would signal an end, or the beginning of an end, to Russia‘s lax approach to intellectual 
property violations. See Press Release, U.S.-Russia Bilateral Agreement, supra note 9. 
 11. Namely, by enacting Part IV of the Russian Civil Code, which deals specifically with 
intellectual property, thus replacing most of Russia‘s former civil legislation in intellectual property 
rights. See OFFICE OF UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, RUSSIA 10 (2008), http://www.ustr. 
gov/sites/default/files/uploads/reports/2008/NTE/asset_upload_file602_14668.pdf.  
 12. For example, see Court Acquits allofmp3.com Site Owner, CNN.COM, Aug. 15, 2007, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2007/TECH/biztech/08/15/russia.site.reut. 
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only to resume pirating activities, and illegal copies are returned to the 
streets for sale.
13
 
Russia is, by far, the largest country in the world in terms of land mass 
and has a population of over 140 million.
14
 It has vast resources, both 
human and natural. It is one of the world‘s largest suppliers of oil and 
natural gas.
15
 Its reliance on these materials, however, leaves the country 
vulnerable to changes in world commodity prices.
16
 In order for Russia to 
more fully enjoy a place in the world marketplace and maintain a 
sustainable economy, it needs to diversify its economy and move away 
from reliance on non-renewable or slowly renewed resources.
17
 In order to 
achieve economic diversification, Russia must implement a strong 
intellectual property scheme that stimulates foreign investment. Protection 
of intellectual property rights is especially important to persons looking to 
invest.
18
 Further, by strengthening its intellectual property regime to 
comply with the 2006 Side Letter, Russia will move closer toward 
possible accession into the WTO. Membership in the WTO would confer 
upon Russia the benefit of increased foreign investment,
19
 market 
 
 
 13.  
[T]he raids run by the police and the municipal authorities were not generally followed up by 
prosecutors and the courts. The pattern of successful raids without successful prosecutions 
(with a few exceptions) is a recurring problem. In addition, it is estimated that up to 70% of 
pirated product seized in raids in Russia finds its way back into the market through either the 
Veteran‘s Fund or the Trade Houses in the Ministry of Justice, which both claim the right to 
sell pirate discs on the open market. 
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE [IIPA], 2005 SPECIAL 301 REPORT: RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION 19 (2005), http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2005/2005SPEC301RUSSIA.pdf [hereinafter IIPA, 
2005 SPECIAL 301 REPORT].  
 14. Russia has an area of 17,098,242 square kilometers, and, as of July 2009, an estimated 
population of 140,041,247. Central Intelligence Agency, Russia, WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia. 
gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2009). 
 15. Id. (stating that Russia is the world‘s largest exporter of oil and second largest exporter of 
natural gas). 
 16. Id. See also supra note 2.  
 17. In 2006, The Moscow Times reported:  
 Despite enjoying a seventh consecutive year of economic growth on the back of booming 
oil prices, the country is underperforming in attracting foreign investment . . . . Unless active 
steps are taken to diversify the economy away from oil and gas . . . the momentum for a major 
breakthrough in sustainable growth could be lost . . . . 
 ―The real question before us . . . is whether the Russian economy will do as well as it is 
capable of doing.‖ 
Valeria Korchagina, Foreign Investors Seek More Clarity, MOSCOW TIMES, Mar. 2, 2006 (quoting 
U.S. Ambassador William Burns), http://www.moscowtimes.ru/article/852/49/206482.html.  
 18. Id. Further, one of Russia‘s main hurdles to realizing its potential for growth is intellectual 
property rights protection. Id. 
 19. Russia has recognized that its intellectual property rights deficiencies have led to wary 
investors. The Moscow Times reported:  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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diversification, and elimination of arbitrary trade sanctions by other 
countries;
20
 Russia would no longer face the stigma of being the only 
major world power that is not a member of the WTO.
21
 
Russia‘s losses due to intellectual property violations are not confined 
to those associated with foreign relations.
22
 Reports suggest that Russia 
loses $823 million in taxes and thousands of jobs because legitimate 
markets are replaced by markets for pirated goods.
23
 Also, a high 
percentage of Russia‘s pirated goods and piracy operations are controlled 
by organized crime.
24
 It is thought that piratical activities create as much 
revenue for organized crime groups as the trafficking of illegal drugs.
25
 In 
order to have a real impact on the activities of organized criminal groups, 
strong stances are needed both in legislation and enforcement. Local 
 
 
Multinational companies are quick to turn away from markets where counterfeiting laws are 
toothless and unpopular, said the International Chamber of Commerce report, which 
suggested that Russia‘s courtship of global business partners must be suffering. On every 
front—from the state‘s unwillingness to meet international intellectual property standards to 
the local media‘s ―disregard for the importance of combating piracy‖—the survey of 48 
global firms found perceptions of Russia and China to be worst by far. 
Simon Shuster, Piracy Watchdog Picks Out Russia for Criticism, MOSCOW TIMES, Jan. 30, 2007, 
http://www.moscowtimes.ru/article/852/49/199436.html. 
 20. Paul Blustein, Bush Urged to Be Cautious of Russia Joining WTO, WASH. POST, July 13, 
2006, at A17. 
 21. In February 2008, after fourteen years of negotiations, Ukraine joined the WTO. Andrew E. 
Kramer, Ukraine, Eager for Ties to the West, Joins the W.T.O., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2008, at C4, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/06/business/worldbusiness/06trade.html; Boris 
Kagarlitsky, WTO Victory Could Backfire for Ukraine, MOSCOW TIMES, Feb. 21, 2008, http://www. 
moscowtimes.ru/article/1040/42/356021.html. Russian officials were frustrated with this decision, 
claiming that Ukraine had more serious violations of intellectual property laws than they had. Id. 
 22. Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 4, at 32. 
 23.  
 The piracy levels and dollar losses in Russia are very high for an economy as well 
developed as the Russian market. These high piracy levels cost the Russian economy millions 
of dollars in lost jobs and lost taxes. In a study undertaken by the software industry 
(BSA/IDC Study, December 2005), it was estimated that if levels of piracy could be reduced 
by 10 points, it would add $23.5 billion to the Russian economy and create 33,700 new 
jobs—more jobs than are currently employed in Russia‘s hardware, software, and services 
sector combined. It would also generate $15 billion in local industry revenues and $823 
million in tax revenues. 
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE, 2007 SPECIAL 301 REPORT: RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION 127, http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2007/2007SPEC301RUSSIA.pdf [hereinafter IIPA, 2007 
SPECIAL 301 REPORT]. 
 24. Nikola Krastev, Report Says Film Piracy, Organized Crime Intertwined in Russia, RADIO 
FREE EUROPE RADIO LIBERTY, Mar. 21, 2009, http://www.rferl.org/content/Report_Says_Film_ 
Piracy_Organized_Crime_Intertwined_In_Russia_/1514434.html (―DVD piracy has become the 
domain of organized crime groups . . . . [F]ilm piracy has become a key part of Russian organized 
crime‘s illegal business portfolio.‖ (citing GREGORY F. TREVERTON ET AL., FILM PIRACY, ORGANIZED 
CRIME, AND TERRORISM (2009), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_ 
MG742.pdf)).  
 25. IIPA, 2005 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 13, at 16. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss1/5
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authorities must be willing to withstand corruption and exercise vigilance 
in gathering evidence against leaders of these syndicates. Above this, 
Russian courts need to be willing to impose deterrent penalties in terms of 
fines and jail time for owners of facilities that produce pirated material. 
Until there are strong deterrents against intellectual property violations, 
organized crime will continue to profit from piracy. 
Russia‘s ability to join the world marketplace has important 
implications for the United States as well. With acceptable intellectual 
property rights protection, Russia‘s legitimate entertainment and business 
market will expand. Counterfeit items currently comprise up to eighty 
percent of markets in major Russian cities, leaving little market space for 
legitimate products.
26
 Further, with prolonged turmoil in the Middle East, 
a healthy and sustainable trade relationship with Russia could mean ―a 
reliable source of oil, regardless of what might be happening in the 
Gulf.‖27 
For years, under Czarist rule, Russia tried to emulate the West. The 
upheaval of the Communist Revolution was, in part, the reaction of a 
characteristically non-Western Slavophile intelligentsia and working class 
to the Western-imposed ideals of the upper class. The complicated 
relationship that Russia, under the Soviet Union, had with the rest of the 
world, and the subsequent fall of the Soviet Union, left Russia 
disadvantaged in many ways. After the fall, the government was in 
disarray.
28
 Though Russia was founded in the ninth century, many critical 
elements of its government were dramatically reformed and have existed 
for less than two decades.
29
 
Despite previous tensions with Russia, it is important for the United 
States to attempt to understand and cooperate with Russia as it continues 
to regain and surpass the prosperity and international power it enjoyed as 
part of the Soviet Union. As Thomas Graham, a former adviser on Russia 
 
 
 26. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE, 2009 SPECIAL 301 REPORT: RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION 127, 122, http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2009/2009SPEC301RUSSIA.pdf. 
 27. Emma Clark, Russia’s Bid for Economic Greatness, BBC NEWS, May, 24, 2002, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/business/2002455.stm. Further, increased foreign investment in Russia 
will facilitate an upgrade in Russia‘s oil and natural gas technology. Id. 
 28. ―[There was] widespread chaos [in] the 1990s[:] violent turf wars between criminal groups in 
Moscow, St. Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, and Vladivostok and bankers regularly targeted for 
kidnapping or assault . . . .‖ GREGORY F. TREVERTON ET AL., FILM PIRACY, ORGANIZED CRIME, AND 
TERRORISM 98 (2009) (footnotes omitted). 
 29. See Kelly L. Ross, Successors of Rome: Russia, 862-Present, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FRIESIAN 
SCHOOL, FOURTH SERIES, http://www.friesian.com/russia.htm. 
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to President George W. Bush said, ―You can‘t do without Russia, so the 
question is how you manage relations with Russia.‖30 
This Note gives a brief history of Russian intellectual property laws, 
beginning with Czarist Era protection, moving through massive shifts 
during the Soviet Era, and arriving at the gaping holes left after the fall of 
the Soviet Union. Next, this Note discusses Russia‘s current struggle to 
gain control over its piracy problems, including its continuing attempts to 
join the WTO, its progress made under the 2006 Side Letter, and the 
implementation of Part IV of the Civil Code. This Note suggests that 
diligent and thorough enforcement by Russian courts will give synergy to 
enforcement efforts by police and legislators. Russia‘s difficult transition 
into a market economy and its move toward a more complete intellectual 
property legislation will be eased if piracy is deterred due to judicially 
imposed criminal sanctions.  
CZARIST ERA 
―[D]evelopments in Russian intellectual property law have mirrored 
the country’s political evolution.‖ 
—Julian Zegelman, Researching Intellectual Property Law in the 
Russian Federation
31
 
The Czars of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries 
looked to the West for political, scientific, and cultural ideologies and 
advancements.
32
 Thus, during Czarist times, Russia‘s intellectual property 
laws were apace with modernity.
33
 
Authors‘ rights were first given protection under the ―Censorship 
Statute of 22 April 1828.‖ Further, the ―‗Regulations [or Statute] on 
privileges for inventions and improvements‘ enacted May 20, 1896, 
already contained most of the elements of a modern patent system, such as 
the enablement, novelty and utility requirements, and a fifteen-year 
exclusive patent term.‖34  
 
 
 30. Anatoly Medetsky, Anna Smolchenko, & Emma Stickgold, Gref Calls WTO Top Priority 
This Year, MOSCOW TIMES, Apr. 5, 2007, http://www.moscowtimes.ru/article/850/49/197919.html. 
 31. Julian Zegelman, Researching Intellectual Property Law in the Russian Federation, LAW & 
TECH. RES. FOR LEGAL PROF‘LS, Feb. 14, 2009, http://www.llrx.com/features/russiaiplaw.htm. 
 32. Ross, supra note 29. 
 33. Zegelman, supra note 31. 
 34. Id. For further discussion of the development of Czarist intellectual property rights, see 
WILLIAM E. BUTLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN RUSSIA, at xxiii (William E. Butler trans., 
Wildy, Simmonds & Hill Publishing 4th ed. 2005) (1998). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss1/5
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Due to the vast scientific and cultural changes that occurred during the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, intellectual property law also evolved 
to keep up with progress. In 1911, the demand for reform was met with 
―[t]he first detailed and balanced national Statute on copyright . . . .‖35 
Given the path of Czarist intellectual property protection, it is easy to 
imagine that without the great upheaval of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution 
and its effects on property rights, including intellectual property rights, 
Russia would not be facing the same problems with piracy as it is today. 
SOVIET ERA 
After the Communist Revolution of 1917, Russia‘s political and 
economic systems were immediately and permanently changed to meet 
Socialist ideals.
36
 Theoretically, Russia had new rulers, new owners, and a 
new, all-encompassing class—―The People.‖ As most personal property 
shifted to the State, or ―The People,‖ intellectual property rights not 
surprisingly underwent drastic changes in protection.
37
 The potential of the 
1911 legislation, which had promised to keep Russia‘s intellectual 
property protection well established, was lost.  
Immediately following the Revolution, the new leaders of the Soviet 
Union had more pressing concerns than overhauling Russia‘s intellectual 
property laws.
38
 The need for evolved protections most likely became clear 
later during attempts to reorganize and publicize industries.
39
 If inventions 
and technology were no longer recognized as the sole domain of their 
creator, that would eliminate costs and administrative headaches that went 
along with patent protection during rapid industrialization. Also, in 1917 
the Soviet government was largely free from international agreements 
concerning intellectual property rights, making it easier for the 
government to create its own scheme.
40
 
 
 
 35. Dmitry Golovanov, Transformation of Authors’ Rights and Neighbouring Rights in Russia, 
LEGAL OBSERVATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN AUDIOVISUAL OBSERVATORY, Feb. 2008, at 2, 2 (IRIS plus 
Supp. 2008), available at http://www.obs.coe.int/oea_publ/iris/iris_plus/iplus2_2008.pdf.en. 
 36. ―The capitalist monarchy was gone, replaced by a Soviet Socialist Republic, with its 
regulated planned economy, subsidized production and complete lack of private enterprise and private 
ownership of property.‖ Zegelman, supra note 31. 
 37. See Levitsky, infra note 40. 
 38. Zegelman, supra note 31. 
 39. Id. 
 40.  
 When the Soviet government assumed power in Russia in 1917, it was virtually free from 
multilateral or bilateral obligations relating to the protection of copyright. Not only has the 
revolutionary government adopted a policy of disregarding all obligations entered into by the 
Imperial and Provisional governments, but the four bilateral copyright conventions concluded 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
138 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 9:131 
 
 
 
 
What we know as ―intellectual property‖ in Russia is often broken up 
into ―author‘s rights‖ and patents.41 It is possible that the difference in 
understanding the product of intellectual pursuit as ‗rights‘ instead of 
‗property‘ curtailed immediate upheaval of intellectual property 
protection. This semantic difference may also have affected the rights that 
the Soviet Union did recognize and protect.
42
 
LEGISLATION IN THE INTERIM BETWEEN THE REVOLUTION AND THE FALL 
OF THE USSR  
The New Economic Policy (―NEP‖), which spanned a critical period 
during the first half of the 1920s wherein there was, under Vladimir Lenin, 
a small resurgence of private enterprise,
43
 further affected Soviet 
intellectual property protection.
44
 However, despite early aims of the NEP, 
 
 
by the Imperial government between 1911 and 1915 had either already expired, or were about 
to expire. 
Serge L. Levitsky, The Beginnings of Soviet Copyright Legislation 1917–1925, 50 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR 
RECHTSGESCHIEDENIS 49 (1982) (footnotes omitted). Russia had agreements with France, Germany 
(which expired before the 1917 Revolution), Denmark, and Belgium, which ―[t]he Soviet government 
did not enforce . . . during the remaining period of their validity. The first Soviet bilateral convention 
. . . was to be signed only in 1967.‖ Id. 
 41. For a more detailed description of author‘s rights, including neighboring rights, see 
Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [GK] [Civil Code] art. 5-43 (Russ.), as translated in BUTLER, supra note 34, 
at 20–55.  
 42. ―Soviet legal doctrine avoided the term ‗intellectual property‘ or ownership altogether, it 
being criticized for not only its inaccuracy but for being bourgeois and exploitative.‖ BUTLER, supra 
note 34, at x. The term ―intellectual property‖ re-emerged in legislation following the fall of the Soviet 
Union. Id.  
 43.  
[T]he development of [the NEP] coincided with a nearly disastrous breakdown in industrial 
and agricultural production and with the outbreak of severe famine and revolts among the 
peasantry. Lenin, acknowledging that the transformation had been pushed too fast, advocated 
an immediate retrenchment and the adoption of ―state capitalism‖. 
Robert C. North, The NEP and the New Democracy, 24 PAC. AFFAIRS 52, 53 (1951) (footnote 
omitted). 
 The NEP had several purposes, such as increased production of grain and fuel, and improving the 
position of the peasantry, as the newly formed state solidified its market. 
 In order to achieve these various purposes, Lenin‘s NEP restored freedom of trade within 
the country and revived a money economy; industry was decentralized, cooperatives were put 
on an independent basis; and concessions were made to the peasantry, to foreign capitalists, 
and to small private traders. In nearly every phase of economics and politics, moderation 
replaced . . . inflexible dogmatism . . . . 
Id. at 54 (footnote omitted).  
 44. For example, during the NEP, though the state maintained a majority of printing rights, 
legislation allowed for limited private printers, though they were subject to strict guidelines. This was 
significant because prior to the NEP, the Soviet government had commandeered all control of all 
printing and had essentially named itself the owner of many of the works being printed. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss1/5
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subsequent legislation hindered copyright protection in the early Soviet 
Era. When Joseph Stalin rose to power after Lenin‘s death in 1924, the 
policies of the NEP were abandoned for more aggressive and prototypical 
socialist schemes of the government controlling intellectual property.
45
 
By 1925 author‘s rights had begun to be recognized.46 The 1925 
principles were improved upon by the Law on Author‘s Rights of 8 
October 1928.
47
 The basic aims were to nationalize and monopolize works 
and publishing, most markedly of deceased Russian writers.
48
 These made 
 
 
 The decree of 12 December 1921 on ‗private publishing houses‘, a forerunner of the NEP 
legislation, showed the unequal alliance between socialist economy and private enterprise at 
work:  
 (a) Private publishers were allowed to own and rent workshops . . . and to sell their 
output . . . at market prices. But the grant of one-year permits to operate such establishments 
remained within the government‘s discretionary power (Sections 2, 3).  
 (b) All manuscripts intended for publication were subject to preliminary censorship by 
the State Publishing House . . . . [This] censorship was extended from privately published to 
all published works, and survived the NEP experiment to become a long-term feature of 
Soviet publishing. . . . 
 (c) Although . . . private publishers were authorised to sell their products at market 
prices, the State Publishing House . . . possessed . . . an option of buying out the output of 
private publishers, or parts of it, at prices not higher than the wholesale price.  
 (d) Textbooks and other teaching aids remained . . . subject to the monopoly of the State 
Publishing House (Gosizdat). 
Levitsky, supra note 40, at 56–57 (footnotes omitted). 
 45. Zegelman, supra note 31. 
 46. BUTLER, supra note 34, at xiv. 
 47. Id at xiv–xv. 
 48. Serge Levitsky, a scholar of Soviet copyright and politics, describes the four aims prior to the 
Copyright Act of 1925: ―(1) nationalisation of the Russian classics; (2) monopolisation of publishing 
rights and the publishing industry; (3) establishment of government-approved tariffs for the 
remuneration of authors of published works; and (4) abolition of copyright protection after the death of 
the author.‖ Levitsky, supra note 40, at 49–50. Furtherance of these aims was achieved in a number of 
ways. For example, in response to the unemployment of printers: 
 A degree issued on 29 December 1917 by the RSFSR Central Executive Committee 
[mere months after Bolshevik takeover] . . . arrange[d] for the publication . . . of the works of 
deceased Russian ‗classics‘ to which the copyright had already expired. In addition, the 
[People‘s Commission on Education] was authorised to ‗nationalise‘ the works of any 
Russian author and to declare a government monopoly on publishing these works, for a 
period of up to five years. Although the monopoly was limited in time, the nationalisation 
was not. 
Id. at 50 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). Although this decree covered only deceased 
authors, by its terms it ―also covered authors of musical compositions and stage productions.‖ Id. 
Royalties from productions of these works went to the state. Id. See also BUTLER, supra note 34, at 
xiv, which states: 
The Soviet authorities preoccupied themselves with reserving the right to establish a State 
monopoly over the authors‘ rights of certain writers and, from 26 November 1918, over any 
writers, published or unpublished, and following the abolition of inheritance in general by the 
Bolsheviks, the inheritance rights of authors and their descendants were not recognized. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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it possible for the government to compulsorily purchase authors‘ rights.49 
Though this was not common practice, it is indicative of the ideology that 
Soviet officials imposed on the concept of intellectual property—it had 
become a public commodity, as other private property had become. There 
was, however, some form of ownership retained if the state chose not to 
exercise its right of purchase. For instance, in 1925, the author‘s right was 
recognized for twenty-five years from the date of publication.
50
 In 1928, 
the right endured for the life of the author and to his heirs for fifteen years, 
possibly greater than twenty-five years.
51
  
The Civil Code, adopted in 1964, was the first piece of significant 
author‘s rights legislation since the early Soviet days.52 Though it fell short 
of international treaties, it went further to recognize the rights of the author 
than previous practice or legislation.
53
 This departure from international 
standards, such as the TRIPS WTO agreement,
54
 continued through the 
fall of the Soviet Union and did little to solve the already prevalent 
problem of piracy.
55
 Failure to meet international standards is still an issue 
for Russia, as it looks to further participate in the world marketplace.
56
  
 
 
 49. BUTLER, supra note 34, at xv. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Golovanov, supra note 35, at 2. 
 53.  
The Soviet period was marked by a very long path from revocation of the tsarist law and 
complete negation of author‘s rights to a curtailed and limited admission of rightsholders [sic] 
rights and interests in the Civil Code adopted in 1964. The Code granted a lower level of 
protection than what was required by international treaties on copyright. The Soviet Union 
joined these treaties, but did not adapt its own legislation. In the late 1980s when the need for 
economic liberalisation and perestroika was acknowledged the drafting of new legislation 
started. The last Soviet law dealing with copyright issues was adopted in June 1991 just six 
months before the fall of the Soviet Union. 
Id. 
 54. ―The TRIPS Agreement . . . is to date the most comprehensive multilateral agreement on 
intellectual property.‖ World Trade Organization, A More Detailed Overview of the TRIPS 
Agreement, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2009). The 
agreement focuses on minimum standards, domestic enforcement, and dispute settlement. Id. 
 55. It was not just the official policy of the State to nationalize works and inventions at will that 
led to intellectual property violations in Russia. Indicators also point to other Soviet policies that 
effectively encouraged piracy. 
The clandestine recording industry emerged in Russia some 30 years ago. During the Soviet 
years the only state recording company[,] Melodia, following the lead of the Communist 
Party, pretended that neither The Beatles nor The Rolling Stones existed. The gap was filled 
by enthusiasts who copied vinyl LPs . . . . After the fall of communism, the bootleggers 
snatched the Melodia‘s producing facilities and started a new industry, filling shops with 
pirated LPs and CDs.  
Alexander Koliandre, Russia Battles Against CD Piracy, BBC NEWS, Jan. 7, 2003, http://news.bbc. 
co.uk/2/low/business/2578989.stm. 
 56. For further reading regarding author‘s rights during the Soviet Era through the present, see 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss1/5
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Though these author‘s rights are significantly more limited than 
Russia‘s current policies or even (potentially) those of its 
contemporaries,
57
 they provide significantly greater patent protection than 
during the early Soviet Era.
58
 After the Soviet takeover, the ―Regulations 
on privileges for inventions and improvements of 1896‖ remained in effect 
until 1919. Soviet legislation then dispensed with the statute in the Decret 
(Decree) of 30 June 1919, which repealed ―all laws and statutes on 
privileges for inventions published before the Decret‖ and ―the Russian 
State was declared to have the right to alienate to its use any invention 
deemed to be useful by the Committee for inventions.‖59 This framework, 
more than discouraging inventors to seek protection, would also 
discourage users and potential users from seeking to obtain the rights to 
certain inventions, and rather would encourage them to continue use 
without specific regard to the patent owners of the inventions. 
As with author‘s rights, the NEP had a brief revival of patent rights 
with the ―Statute on Patents and Inventions of September 12, 1924.‖60 
Under this statute, patents were issued for fifteen years, and patent rights 
were alienable.
61
 The State, however, retained power to compulsorily 
alienate a patent or create a license for the State.
62
 The ―Statute of 
Inventions and Technical Improvements of 1931‖ replaced the ―Statute on 
Patents and Inventions.‖63 The effect of this change was the return of the 
author‘s certificate from the Decret of 1919.64 Subsequent to this, although 
 
 
Dmitry Golovanov, supra note 35. 
 57. Currently, U.S. copyright protection lasts for seventy years after the death of the author. 17 
U.S.C. § 302(a) (1978). Under the Copyright Act of 1909, works were copyrighted for a twenty-eight 
year term, which was renewable for a second term of equal duration, for a total of fifty-six years. 
Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, §§ 23, 24, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080–81 (1909). 
 58. See generally Levitsky, supra note 48. 
 59. BUTLER, supra note 34, at xxiv.  
[E]xcluding secret inventions for defense or of special importance to Russia, [inventions] 
were in the common use of all citizens and institutions on conditions to be specially stipulated 
in each case. The author of such an invention was guaranteed recognition and protection of 
his right of authorship and remuneration certified by an author‘s certificate. The 
remuneration, determined by the commission, was more in the nature of a bonus . . . . In 
reality the remuneration was derisory and most inventors, rather than risk nationalization of 
their invention, preferred not to seek protection at all. 
Id. Not only was this framework a vast departure from previous practices in former Russia, but 
requiring conditions to be ―stipulated in each case‖ must have caused administrative nightmares, 
especially in a country industrializing as quickly as the USSR has been at this point. 
 60. Id. at xxiv–xxv. 
 61. Id. at xxv. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at xxv.  
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patents were not formally abolished, their granting was disfavored by 
Soviet officials.
65
 
Provisions of ―patent law‖ remained fairly static until President 
Mikhail Gorbachev instituted Perestroika in 1991 and turned the country 
toward more market-oriented laws.
66
 Under the emerging system, there 
were many amendments and revisions underway when the Soviet Union 
collapsed in 1991 (―Fall‖).67 Before the collapse, many of the laws of the 
Soviet Union were being rewritten because they were simply not feasible 
in a modern economy and in a country that was in dire straits. However, 
having somewhat obsolete laws in effect at the time of the Fall, with new 
ones still being created, left successor states in a difficult situation as they 
relied on former legal and government structures in the immediate wake of 
the Fall. Though Russia seceded from the Soviet Union on December 12, 
1991, it was not until two years later, on December 12, 1993, that the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation was adopted, replacing the Soviet 
Constitution of April 12, 1978.
68
 
POST-SOVIET AND CURRENT LEGISLATION 
―With the demise of the USSR, the protection of industrial property [or 
intellectual property] in Russia was in a desperate position. Russia itself 
 
 
 65. Russia also claims loss due to intellectual property violations on products owned by their 
government or citizens:  
[P]ast self-imposed isolation is now haunting Russian producers of anything from vodka to 
weapons. They have been fighting legal battles to get back their brand names lifted by 
unscrupulous rivals both at home and abroad. But there are loopholes in the recently adopted 
Russian copyright law that allow domestic manufacturers to pirate foreign goods. 
Nikolai Gorshkov, Russian Producer Wins Kalashnikov Rights, BBC NEWS, June 2, 2002, http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/2/low/europe/2021173.stm. To further its ideological ends, the Soviet government 
essentially encouraged other nations, with poor intellectual protection, to produce goods that the Soviet 
Union had patents on. Even though many of these countries initially had licenses granted by the Soviet 
Union, some products, most notably the Kalishnikov 1947 rifle (AK-47), continue to be produced with 
expired or no licenses. Id. Russia claims to have lost millions in revenue from copyright infringement 
on this particular weapon and, in the past, it has taken a defensive position when countries, such as the 
United States, accuse them of intellectual property violation, countering that the United States 
participates in the use, sale, and movements of these rifles. See C.J. Chivers, Who’s a Pirate? Russia 
Points Back at the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2004, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes. 
com/2004/07/26/international/europe/26russ.html. Russia‘s claims, however, just serve as further 
proof of its need to establish an adequate approach to intellectual property rights protection so it is able 
to protect not only foreign interests, but those of its own citizens. ―Russia‘s complaints about copyright 
abuse are usually met with suggestions to put its own house in order.‖ Gorshkov, supra note 65. 
 66. See Zegelman, supra note 31. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution], English version, available at 
http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-01.htm. 
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had no patent department and the 1991 USSR Law on Inventions was 
inconsistent with several Russian Federation laws, including those on 
taxation, enterprise, and investments. . . .‖69 
Just before the fall of Communism, Soviet laws underwent massive 
restructuring.
70
 Though the Fall clearly disrupted and halted legislative 
progress, many of the laws, as they were being amended, were adopted 
early on by the Russian Federation.
71
 Legislation on intellectual property,
72
 
though much improved from early Soviet eras,
73
 remained largely an 
 
 
 69. BUTLER, supra note 34, at xxvi. 
 70. See Zegelman, supra note 31. 
 71.  
In the twilight years of the USSR reform of intellectual property legislation enjoyed high 
priority. On 31 May 1991 the USSR adopted new Fundamental Principles of Civil Legislation 
of the USSR and Republics [1991 FPCivL], with effect from 1 January 1992, and the Law on 
Inventions in the USSR. On 3 July 1991 the Law on Trademarks and Service Marks was 
enacted. Since the Government of the USSR had signaled its willingness to accede to the 
Berne Convention and the Paris Protocol of the Geneva Convention, their provisions were 
taken into account when drafting the 1991 FPCivL and individual laws adopted by the USSR 
in 1991 on author‘s rights. The Soviet Union disappeared before the 1991 FPCivL had 
entered into force. The Russian Federation with effect from 3 August 1992 introduced the 
1991 FPCivL into force on its territory until a new civil code was enacted to replace that of 
1964. 
BUTLER, supra note 34, at xv–xvi (footnotes omitted). 
 72. The Civil Code of 1994 declared intellectual property an object of Civil Rights: 
 In the instances and in the procedure established by the present Code and by other laws 
an exclusive right (intellectual property) of a citizen or juridical person shall be recognized to 
the results of intellectual activity and the means of individualization of the juridical person 
equated to them or the individualization of a product or the work fulfilled or services (firm 
name, trademark, service mark, and others). 
 The use of the results of intellectual activity and means of individualization which are the 
object of exclusive rights (intellectual property) may be effectuated by third persons only with 
the consent of the possessor of the right. 
Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [GK] [Civil Code] art. 138 (Russ.), as translated in BUTLER, supra note 34, 
at 7. 
 Violations of intellectual property rights, which gave redress to author‘s and neighboring rights 
and patent rights infringement, were codified in articles 146 and 147 of the Criminal Code, 
respectively, which also defined the scope of violations and punishments. See BUTLER, supra note 34, 
at 10–11 for an English translation of articles 146 and 147. A key problem with this legislation is that 
it called for criminal enforcement only ―if these acts caused large-scale damage to the author or other 
rights-possessor,‖ which allowed many violations to continue without penalty. Another problem with 
the legislation under article 146 of the Criminal Code was that it  
permit[s] the confiscation and destruction of pirate and counterfeit goods—that is, the illegal 
copies themselves. . . . [However,] it does not explicitly provide for the confiscation and 
destruction of the ―machinery‖ used in the making of illegal copies. . . . Thus, as a practical 
matter ―machinery‖ used to create illegal copies cannot be confiscated in criminal cases. 
IIPA, 2005 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 13, at 28. 
 73. For example,  
 [t]he 1991 FPCivL . . . excluded the free use of works in the cinema, radio, and television 
or the public performance of works without the author‘s consent. The range of works subject 
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extension of Soviet initiatives,
74
 which subsequent amendments did not go 
far enough to reform and were largely ineffective for deterring piracy 
because they were unclear, overly lax, and did not provide deterrent 
penalties.
75
 What is more, there were gaps in patent legislation that led to 
confusion as to rights held by certain patent holders, especially those who 
filed for a patent in the period surrounding the Fall.
76
 
 
 
to protection was enlarged, the period of author‘s right extended to up to 50 years after the 
author‘s death, and neighboring rights were recognized for the first time.  
BUTLER, supra note 34, at xvi. 
 74.  
 With the dissolution of the USSR the Russian Federation was well placed to enact its 
own legislation on intellectual property to supplant relevant provisions of the 1964 RSFSR 
[Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic] Civil Code and the 1991 FPCivL. In 1992–
1993 the Russian Federation adopted the Patent Law of 23 September 1992, the Law on 
Trademarks, Service Marks, and Names of Places of Origin of Goods of 23 September 1992, 
the Law on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs and Data Bases of 23 September 
1992, the Law on Author‘s Right and Neighboring Rights of 9 July 1993, the Law on 
Selection Achievements of 6 August 1993, the Federal Law on Information, Informatization, 
and the Defense of Information of 20 February 1995, and the Federal Law on Architectural 
Activity in the Russian Federation of 17 November 1995, as amended 30 December 2001, 
followed in each case by a substantial body of subordinate acts issued by the President and 
the government of Russia and individual ministries and departments.  
Id. at xii. 
 75. For several years, the International Intellectual Property Alliance (―IIPA‖) called for many 
key reforms in the Russian system, concerned especially with drastically increasing amounts of piracy 
of optical discs. In 2002 they stated that ―Russia‘s legal regime [though relatively good was] still 
deficient in a few key areas‖ and proposed the following ―crucial legal reforms‖ to improve 
enforcement. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE, 2002 SPECIAL 301 REPORT: 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 216 (2002), http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2002/2002SPEC301RUSSIA.pdf. 
These include the need to adopt: (1) proper optical media regulations; (2) amendments to the 
Criminal Procedure Code to provide police with the proper ex officio authority . . . ; (3) 
amendments to the Criminal Code (the problems with Art. 146 ―grave harm‖ provision); (4) 
amendments to the Arbitration Procedure Code and Civil Procedure Code (to provide for ex 
parte search provisions); (5) amendments to strengthen the Administrative Code; (6) 
amendments to the Customs Code (to provide ex officio seizure authority).  
Id. Similar changes were called for in the International Intellectual Property Alliance‘s Special 301 
Reports for 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006, evidencing a standstill in improvement of legislation and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights in Russia. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
ALLIANCE, 2003 SPECIAL 301 REPORT: RUSSIAN FEDERATION (2003), http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2003/ 
2003SPEC301RUSSIA.pdf [hereinafter IIPA, 2003 SPECIAL 301 REPORT]; INTERNATIONAL 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE, 2004 SPECIAL 301 REPORT: RUSSIAN FEDERATION (2004), 
http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2004/2004SPEC301RUSSIA.pdf [hereinafter IIPA, 2004 SPECIAL 301 
REPORT]; IIPA, 2005 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 13; INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
ALLIANCE, 2006 SPECIAL 301 REPORT: RUSSIAN FEDERATION (2006), http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2006/ 
2006SPEC301RUSSIA.pdf [hereinafter IIPA, 2006 SPECIAL 301 REPORT]. 
 76.  
 The Patent Law applies to legal relations which arose after 14 October 1992, the date on 
which the Law entered into force. This approach left open the fate of objects of industrial 
property previously registered or applications in process. All previously issued USSR 
protection documents for inventions and industrial designs . . . are deemed to operate in the 
territory of Russia. . . . But patents issued previously and patents received in place of author‘s 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss1/5
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In the new millennium there have been many key changes to 
intellectual property protection legislation in Russia.
77
 The most notable 
and recent reform was the adoption of Part IV of the Civil Code (―Part 
IV‖), which was signed on December 19, 2006 and went into force on 
January 1, 2008. This legislation replaced the then existing Russian 
intellectual property rights regime.
78
 However, after years of international 
pressure to improve intellectual property right protection, the enactment of 
Part IV left many unsatisfied, citing difficulties in amending the Civil 
Code and Russia‘s continual lack of compliance with international 
treaties.
79
 There is also concern that under Part IV, criminal remedies will 
continue to be avoided in favor of pertinent administrative fines and, when 
coupled with the still limited nature of civil remedies, progress made in the 
adequate enforcement of these new laws will be limited.
80
 This concern is 
 
 
certificates will be deemed invalid on the basis of procedural rules set out in the 1992 Patent 
Law . . . . 
BUTLER, supra note 34, at xxvi–xxvii. 
 77. For a brief overview of recent legal reforms in the Russian intellectual property rights 
regime, see INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE, 2008 SPECIAL 301 REPORT: 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 109 (2008), http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2008/2008SPEC301RUSSIA.pdf 
[hereinafter IIPA, 2008 SPECIAL 301 REPORT]. 
 78. IIPA, 2007 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 23, at 133. Part IV of the Civil Code 
also replaced the Russian patent and trademark laws. Id. 
 79.  
 The adoption of Part IV was undertaken over the strong objections of the U.S. 
Government, the European Union, and other governments, as well as the advice of many 
copyright law experts. First, the Civil Code is very hard to and rarely amended, so the repeal 
of the copyright law will be replaced (in 2008) with an inflexible law that needs to regulate 
new as well as developing technologies. Second, there are many deficiencies in the law . . . 
some even acknowledged by its drafters, which means the current Civil Code does not 
comply with TRIPs or the WIPO digital treaties, among other concerns. The law is in some 
instances unclear—a fact not surprising given its breadth and the expeditious manner in 
which it was drafted and adopted without input from copyright experts. . . . In addition, repeal 
of the Copyright Law will, it is feared, create confusion about the enforcement of IPR 
[intellectual property rights] violations via the Criminal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code, 
the Administrative Code, and the Customs Code. 
Id. 
 80.  
 The problems of civil actions are further exacerbated by the very limited scope of 
available relief. Civil enforcement inadequacies include: remedies generally limited to the 
seizure of repertoire in any specific instance; the failure to award preliminary injunctions, or 
to freeze assets and evidence; low damage awards, which, like all awards, are also very 
difficult to enforce; burdensome evidentiary requirements, including rights ownership 
information; the absence of personal liability for the directors of infringing companies or 
enterprises; and, inadequate contributory liability. 
IIPA, 2008 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 77, at 101. 
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even greater when dealing with the organized crime aspect of piracy.
81
 
Part IV, despite many shortcomings,
82
 is not a complete failure, and 
clarifies legal terms from prior legislation while broadening protection of 
some forms of intellectual property, such as computer programs.
83
  
Overall, Russian intellectual property legislation in recent years has 
been successful. Recent changes in the Criminal Procedure Code have also 
increased the amount of police activity in combating piracy.
84
 Though it 
has not, in many ways, met international standards, Russia has made great 
strides to improve and clarify legislation. As further measures (many of 
them unmet as of July 1, 2008, which was Russia‘s stated goal) prescribed 
by the Side Letter with the United States are implemented, it is evident 
that on some level, Russia has shown itself willing to comply with 
international markets. However, until enforcement of intellectual property 
rights is effective enough to actually deter offenders, these legal reforms 
will be little more than lip service to the international community and 
violations will continue, costing local and foreign markets billions of 
dollars while funding organized crime. 
ENFORCEMENT 
Despite evolving legislation and increasing numbers of police raids, 
losses due to piracy are still growing.
85
 It is estimated that U.S. industries 
 
 
 81.  
 The music industry emphasizes the need for criminal, rather than civil, enforcement 
directed at optical disc piracy—namely against the criminal enterprises dedicated to the 
manufacture, distribution and sale of pirated materials . . . . Addressing commercial-scale 
piracy through criminal measures is identified as an obligation of WTO members for a 
reason—it is only nation states that have the capacity to deal with these problems. Civil 
measures are intended for ―civil‖ actions—better understood as disagreements between 
parties. Massive and organized criminal activity is most fundamentally not in the nature of a 
disagreement, and civil measures are not capable of delivering the requisite level of 
deterrence. 
Id. 
 82. For a description of amendments to Part IV of the Civil Code recommended by the 
International Intellectual Property Alliance, see id. at 111–12. 
 83. For a description of positive features of Part IV of the Civil Code, see id. at 112. 
 84.  
 Changes of the Russian Criminal Procedure Code, which entered into force in 2006, 
allowing Russian police to initiate criminal cases of copyright infringement, have had a 
positive impact on Russian police activities, as reflected in a sharp increase in the number of 
police raids. A change to the Russian Criminal Code, introduced in 2006 and expected to be 
finally adopted in 2007, would re-categorize copyright infringement as a ―serious‖ crime. 
This too, will have a positive effect on enforcement. 
IIPA, 2007 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 23, at 129.  
 85. See infra note 86. 
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lost $1.430 billion to Russian piracy in 2007, and $1.955 billion in 2006.
86
 
Though the numbers of raids have increased over the past several years,
87
 
the percentage of criminal penalties following these raids remains low.
88
 
Criminal trials against intellectual property violators are needed. Instead of 
criminal penalties, sanctions have been primarily civil or administrative 
penalties, with few offenders facing heavy fines or jail time.
89
 
Furthermore, despite the growing number of raids,
90
 the capacity to 
 
 
 86. Press Release, International Intellectual Property Alliance, The Copyright Industries in the 
International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) Submit to USTR Their 2008 Report on Piracy in 51 
Countries/Territories: China and Russia Remain Key Problem Countries app. A (Feb. 11, 2008), 
available at http://www.iipa.com/pdf/IIPAFeb2008Special301PressRelease.pdf. These numbers do not 
include loss from motion picture or entertainment software piracy. Id. These numbers have been on a 
steep incline since the turn of the century, likely owing in part to the growing accessibility and use of 
optical discs.  
 Estimated trade losses to U.S. industries due to piracy, in millions of U.S. dollars: 
1998: 963.9 
1999: 873.6 
2000: 637.0 
2001: 847.2 
2002: 1031.9 
2003: 1424.0 
2004: 1784.7 
2005: 1901.8 
See IIPA, 2003 SPECIAL 301 REPORT: supra note 75, at 249; IIPA, 2007 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra 
note 23, at 121. 
 87. The International Intellectual Property Alliance reported in 2008: ―In 2007, the Russian 
Government conducted some significant raids and seizures and the Russian police stepped up 
enforcement against copyright infringers, particularly with respect to street vendor piracy and 
companies involved in the installation and use of pirated software.‖ IIPA, 2008 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, 
supra note 77, at 101. 
 88. Id. at 102. 
 89. Id. at 101. 
 90. Near the end of 2006, authorities attempted to step up raids of optical disc plants. For a long 
time raids were largely ineffective because they were not truly ―surprise‖ raids, allowing the plants to 
cover their illegal activities. In 2008, the International Intellectual Property Alliance reported:  
 Raids have been undertaken at some optical disc plants, including two at the end of 2006 
and seven plants in 2007. . . .  
 However, the optical disc enforcement regime continues to lack effectiveness evidenced 
by the continued operation of all the raided plants. . . . This highlights both the ineffectiveness 
of the optical disc enforcement regime in ceasing production at offending plants, and also the 
role of corruption, as the lines were never properly secured by the police as is required after a 
raid. 
 These cases highlight the weaknesses that must be addressed if Russia is to meet the 
[Side-Letter] IPR Agreement‘s obligations for effective optical media regulation. With an 
estimated 50 plants in operation, raids at a handful of plants, and surprise inspections at very 
few, IIPA believes there is ample evidence that additional effective enforcement is needed to 
deter illegal activities, and that such enforcements needs to be called for from the highest 
levels within the Russian Government. 
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produce pirated optical discs continues to rise,
91
 some of the production of 
which occurs on state-owned property.
92
  
 
 
Id. at 102–03. 
 Further, the owners of these plants, often organized crime syndicates, are rarely, if ever, held 
responsible, and only rarely are managers of the plants responsible.  
 In general the copyright industries report that deterrent criminal penalties are not being 
imposed against optical disc plant owners or, with few exceptions, against plant operators and 
owners of commercial Internet operations. In fact, in the years since the adoption of the 
criminal penalties (Article 146), we are not aware of a single plant owner who has been 
convicted, and only a handful of plant operators (i.e., plant managers) have served jail time or 
been given suspended sentences. Far fewer criminal cases were initiated against optical disc 
plants in 2007 than in 2006, and, many cases have languished for a long time. 
Id. at 101–02. 
 91. Number of optical disc plants and their capacity by year reported: 
1996: 2 plants 
1998: 3 plants 
1999: 6 plants, 60 million capacity 
2000: 10 plants, 90 million capacity 
2001: 13 plants, 150 million capacity 
2002: 17 plants, 150–183 million capacity 
2003: 26 plants, over 300 million capacity 
2004: 34 plants, 390 million capacity 
2005: 47 plants, 395 million capacity 
2006: 47 plants 
2007: 53 plants (due to consolidation of two plants) 
2008: 50 plants  
See IIPA, 2005 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 13, at 16; IIPA, 2006 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra 
note 75, at 4; IIPA, 2007 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 23, at 116; IIPA, 2008 SPECIAL 301 
REPORT, supra note 77, at 103. 
 Please note that these figures include all types of media contained on optical discs and the number 
of DVD plants rose as the prevalence of the media grew. Also note that not all (though certainly many) 
of these plants have been proven to produce pirated materials. See supra note 90. 
 92.  
The Russian government has publicly stated that as many as 18 plants are located on 
government owned or leased property; these plants on former military bases are known as 
―Russian State (owned) Restricted Access Regime Enterprises‖ (RARE). These RARE plants 
are directly connected to state owned and state run enterprises, and are located on premises 
important to Russian state security officials. Thus, they not only pose a potential security risk 
for the Russian government, they also undermine the government‘s campaign against piracy. 
IIPA, 2006 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 75, at 4. The connection between optical disk piracy and 
organized crime makes this presence on government lands especially problematic. Though the problem 
is not resolved, 
 On a positive note, the Russian Government has taken steps to address the problem of 
[RARE] that house or run optical disc plants. The Russian Government reported in the Fall of 
2007 that there were ten of these RARE plants . . . and that it was taking steps against nine of 
the ten such plants to cancel their leases. . . . [However] at year‘s end, there were seven such 
RARE plants still in operation. 
IIPA, 2008 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 77, at 106. 
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The Russian market has not grown in proportion to the increasing 
capacity to produce pirated materials, which indicates that pirated goods 
made in Russia do not always stay in Russia.
93
 Further, the international 
implications of the volume of pirated goods produced reflect an increased 
involvement by organized crime and its increased revenue, without 
corresponding criminal penalties to compensate for the lucrative, yet 
economically damaging, enterprise.
94
 
It is important for Russian courts to demonstrate that intellectual 
property rights enforcement is a priority. Without judicial support, 
political and police efforts will be without force. Because judicial support 
of intellectual property protection measures has been so lax in the past, the 
current courts have opportunities to set precedents that show judicial 
compliance with national and international standards. The frequent call for 
judicial enforcement puts the courts in positions of power as they begin to 
develop intellectual property jurisprudence because their imposition of 
available deterrent measures will undoubtedly spur progress and faith in 
Russian intellectual property enforcement. 
 
 
 93. In 2003, the International Intellectual Property Alliance reported:  
 Russia‘s present manufacturing capacity of CD plants . . . bears no relationship to present 
legitimate demand—probably close to 18 million units. . . . It was only a few years ago that 
Russia‘s production eclipsed the production capacity of the region‘s then worst offender, 
Ukraine. This was caused in part by some of the Ukrainian plants migrating to Russia. But in 
larger part, the explosive growth in Russia has been the result of the criminal syndicates 
operating in Russia expanding their operations, in the absence of any deterrence. The Russian 
optical media problem is one of both domestic production as well as lax border enforcement 
resulting in the receipt and distribution of product from Asian countries . . . . Russia remains a 
major destination and transshipment point for pirate optical media product from these other 
markets. 
IIPA, 2003 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 75, at 250. 
 94.  
[C]opyright industries report that although more criminal cases have been commenced than in 
prior years, most cases do not result in deterrent penalties as a final disposition. There have 
been some notable and important exceptions: in April, in a raid in Krasnodarsky Kray a jail 
sentence was imposed; and in May, in St. Petersburg, the first-ever jail sentence was imposed 
against a DVD/software shop owner (an 8-month sentence). Unfortunately, these examples 
remain the exception to the general practice of non-deterrent sentencing [such as suspended 
sentencing]. . . . The exception is the operator of the Mediasystem plant who was convicted 
and received a 3-year suspended sentence in December 2005 and is currently in prison 
awaiting the conclusion of a second criminal; [sic] investigation. The longest prison sentence 
imposed to date for copyright infringement is four and a half years against two DVD-R 
replicators in Rostov-on-Don . . . . 
IIPA, 2008 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 77, at 102. 
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WTO AND THE BILATERAL SIDE LETTER 
Russia has attempted to join the WTO since 1993.
95
 Russian politicians 
have also stressed their eagerness to join the WTO.
96
 For a long time, the 
United States was a main barrier to Russia‘s accession, in part because of 
the United States‘ opposition to Russia‘s lax intellectual property laws. 
After more than a decade of negotiations, the pressure put on Russia to 
improve its intellectual property laws concluded in the signing of an over 
eight hundred-page document in Hanoi, Vietnam on November 19, 2006 
(intellectual property was not the only focus).
97
 This bilateral agreement 
has proven to be partially effective at inducing Russia to continue raising 
enforcement standards, and as a result, the United States now supports 
Russia‘s bid to enter the WTO.98 
Despite some movement toward implementing the policies outlined in 
the Side Letter, there still remains much to be done, and some of the 
progress is less hopeful than it would initially seem.
99
 Also, the June 1, 
 
 
 95. Russia WTO Bid Gathers Pace, BBC NEWS, June 25, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
business/1406636.stm. 
 96. Medvedev Says Russia Certain to Join WTO, RIA NOVOSTI, Oct. 21, 2009, http://en.rian.ru/ 
russia/20091021/156544077.html.  
 97. This agreement has the status of an international agreement under U.S. and Russian law. The 
Side Letter deals with optical disc issues and it requires the Russian Government to: 
 1. Address the need for effective criminal enforcement, focusing in particular on piracy 
―committed for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain‖ by referring ―to 
the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation a proposal for it to pass a resolution of the 
Plenum of the Supreme Court‖ to clarify for the courts their practices so that they impose stiff 
penalties for IPR violation, and requiring that judges ―take into account the high degree of 
public harm from such infringement.‖ 
 2. Address the need for effective border enforcement . . . . 
 3. Address the need to combat the growing threat of Internet piracy . . . . 
 4. Adopt legislation to ―fully implement the TRIPs Agreement and other IPR-related 
international agreements‖ to which the United States and Russia are already parties . . . . 
 5. Ensure on-going dialog and work to implement the obligations above through a 
Bilateral Working Group, as well as to provide appropriate training to Russian enforcement 
officials. 
IIPA, 2008 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 77, at 106–07. 
 98. U.S. Supports Russia’s Bid to Join WTO, Says Clinton, CHINA VIEW. Oct. 15, 2009, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-10/14/content_12231991.htm. 
 99. For example, the internet music download site, allofmp3.com, which, during negotiations for 
the Side Letter, was cited as a particularly glaring offender of intellectual property rights violations, 
has been taken down. IIPA, 2008 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 77, at 105. However:  
a nearly identical site is now in operation that is apparently owned and operated by the same 
or related parties—illustrating the need for corporate criminal liability and the criminal 
sentencing of principals of pirate operations, as well as the need for better information about 
and the investigation of these judicial entities.  
Id. at 108. 
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2007 deadlines were not met for many of the aspects of the agreement, 
including optical disc production and criminal law enforcement.
100
 It is a 
slow process, however, and it is important not to undermine positive 
movements by over focusing on areas of deficiency. For example, on April 
26, 2007, the Supreme Court adopted a resolution detailing intellectual 
property rights enforcement practices.
101
 The adoption of Part IV has also 
been positive, not in the least for demonstrating that protecting intellectual 
property rights is a vital concern to the country. 
Unfortunately, once the agreement with the United States was made, 
Russia‘s accession seems to have been blocked by a conflict with Georgia 
over trade and recognition of territories.
102
 Since there has been even more 
delay in their accession, Russian politicians, Prime Minister Putin in 
particular, have said that Russia is no longer eager to join the WTO and 
that it would instead be primarily a burden.
103
 This also means, as stated 
by Russian First Deputy Prime Minister, a ―withdrawal from accords that 
contradict its interests.‖104 While this retreat from its previous position is 
primarily over concerns with Georgia,
105
 it may tempt Russian officials to 
again place intellectual property enforcement on the backburner, allowing 
the corruption and apathy of the past to again overshadow positive 
movements to join the international economic community. 
Esprit Eugster  
 
 
 100. Deadlines still need to be met by the Russian government in the following ways:  
(1) address the problem of illegal optical disc manufacturing; (2) effectively enforce criminal 
laws with deterrent penalties for IPR violations (especially focusing on larger enterprises—
and whether committed for purposes of commercial advantage, private financial gain, or 
resulting in substantial economic harm); (3) combat Internet piracy; (4) implement 
international IPR agreements, up to the WTO-TRIPS levels; (5) enact legislation . . . to 
provide Customs officials with the authority to take actions ex officio; and (6) implement and 
ratify the WIPO ―digital‖ treaties (the WCT and the WPPT). 
Id. 
 101. For an overview of other effective enforcement since the implementation of the Side Letter, 
see id. at 109. 
 102. Georgia: Official Says Position Unchanged on Russian WTO Negotiations, RADIO FREE 
EUROPE RADIO LIBERTY, Apr. 30, 2007, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1076202.html. 
 103. Doubts Grow on Russia’s WTO Plans, BBC NEWS, Aug. 26, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ 
hi/7582079.stm. 
 104. Id. 
 105. ―‗The West has been saying that it won‘t allow Russia to join the WTO until it pulls out its 
troops from Georgia,‘ said Yevgeny Gavrilenkov, Troika Dialog investment bank‘s chief economist. 
‗Now (Russia is) virtually saying we don‘t want WTO membership on these terms.‘‖ Id. 
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